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Abstract
This paper works with a broad data sample of Czech voucher-privatized firms during
1996-1999. It analyzes the development of ownership structure and consequently its
effect on a firm's performance Ownership concentration had been quite high in 1996
and steadily increased. The single largest owner was found to be a decisive
shareholder. Industrial companies have been the most stable shareholder and recorded
the largest ownership gains. Ownership concentration alone does not explain a change
in a firm’s performance and no industry sector was found to have a specific effect on
it. We found evidence that several types of owners have an effect on certain
performance measures. However, there does not exist support that type of owner has
an effect on a firm's performance in general.
Abstrakt
Tento článek pracuje s širokým vzorkem dat českých kupónově privatizovaných firem
v období let 1996-1999. Analyzujeme vývoj vlastnické struktury a následně její vliv
na podnikovou výkonnost. Koncentrace vlastnictví byla v roce 1996 poměrně vysoká
a postupně dále rostla. Jediný největší vlastník byl shledán rozhodujícím akcionářem:
průmyslový podnik se jeví jako nejstabilnější akcionář-vlastník a v rozsahu vlastnictví
zaznamenal také největší přírůstky. Samotná koncentrace vlastnictví nevysvětluje
změny v podnikové výkonnosti a žádné hospodářské odvětví na ni nemá specifický
vliv. V případě n ěkolika typů vlastníků jsme nalezli důkazy o jejich vlivu na
specifické ukazatele podnikové výkonnosti. V obecné rovině jsme však podporu pro
vliv typu vlastníka na výkonnost nenalezli.
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1. Introduction and Motivation
The Czech voucher privatization scheme is part of a transition process which can be
considered a unique natural experiment rarely seen on such a scale in the real
economy. Voucher privatized firms swiftly became legally private subjects of the
emerging market economy. This paper analyzes the development of ownership
structure and its effect on performance using an extensive sample of Czech voucher
privatized firms during 1996-1999.
1
First we investigate changes in ownership structure of voucher-privatized
companies based on degree of ownership concentration and type of largest owner.
Further, we analyze relationships between ownership and economic performance of
firms. In particular we address the question whether a change in ownership
concentration of a certain type of shareholder has an impact on a firm's performance.
The critical assumption behind privatization in many parts of the world is that
private ownership together with its concentration improves corporate performance.
The empirical evidence for this assumption comes from two kinds of studies. The first
compares the pre- and post-privatization financial and operating performance (see
D'Souza and Megginson, 1999, among others). They compare the pre- and post-
privatization financial and operating performance of firms in 28 industrialized
countries that were privatized through public share offerings during the period from
1990 to 1996. They document significant increases in profitability, output, operating
efficiency, and dividend payments, and significant decreases in leverage ratios of
                                                                
1 The privatization program in the Czech Republic was carried out under different schemes: restitution,
small-scale privatization and large-scale (or mass) privatization. The first two started in 1990 and were
most important during the early years of transition. Large privatization began in 1991 and was
concluded in early 1995. These issues have been extensively described in the literature and therefore
we do not elaborate on them in this paper. For classical approaches and analysis of pre-privatization
and privatization issues see, among others, Blanchard, Dornbusch, Krugman,  Layard, and Summers
(1991), Aghion, Blanchard, and Burgess (1994), and Aghion, Blanchard, and Carlin (1994).2
firms after privatization. These findings strongly suggest that privatization yields
significant performance improvements.
The second strand focuses on comparing the performance of state firms with either
private (Boardman and Vining, 1989) or privatized (Pohl, Anderson, Claessens, and
Djankov, 1997) firms operating under reasonably similar conditions. Additional
evidence has been obtained recently from a number of studies of the post-communist
transition economies which, because of the existence both state and privatized firms,
have become a favorable testing ground for the general claim that privatization is
effective (see for example Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski, 1997, or
Dharwadkar and Brandes, 2000).
The overall impact of privatization– in spite of expectations – is not always positive.
There are many empirical studies about the impact of different types of privatization
on enterprise performance. Havrylyshyn and McGettingan (2000) review literature on
this topic. In order to evaluate the impact of privatization Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and
Rapaczynski (1999) compare the performance of privatized and state firms in the
transition economies of Central Europe, while controlling for various forms of
selection bias. They argue that privatization has different effects depending on the
types of owners to whom it gives control. In particular, privatization to outsider
owners has significant performance effects. Where privatization is effective, the effect
on revenue performance is very pronounced, but there is no comparable effect on cost
reduction. Overlooking the strong revenue effect of privatization to outsider owners
leads to a substantial overstatement of potential employment losses resulting from
post-privatization restructuring.
A further set of issues related to privatization stems from the post-privatization
structure of ownership and its subsequent evolution. It is the usual wisdom that3
dispersion of ownership has a bad influence on a firm’s performance. Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) survey research on corporate governance, with special attention to the
importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in
corporate governance systems around the world. McConnell and  Servaes (1990)
examine the impact of ownership structure on company economic performance in the
largest European companies. Controlling for industry, capital structure and nation
effects they find a positive effect of ownership concentration on market-to-book value
of equity and profitability. Furthermore they propose and support the hypothesis that
the identity of large owners - family, bank, institutional investor, government, and
other companies - has important implications for corporate strategy and performance.
The effect of ownership concentration is also found to depend on owner identity. On
the other hand, studies by Coase (1988) or Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that the
relation between ownership concentration and corporate performance is spurious.
Also Leech and Leahy (1999) found out that control-type effects have no clear effect
a on firm’s performance.
Smith, Cin, and Vodopivec (1997) examine the relation between employee or
foreign ownership and firm performance. They find that a percentage point increase in
foreign ownership is associated with about a 3.9 percent increase in value-added and
for employee ownership with about a 1.4 percent increase. Claessens and Djankov
(1999) find that the more concentrated the ownership, the higher the firm’s
profitability and labor productivity. Estrin and Rosevear (1999) explore whether
specific ownership forms have led to different performances among firms in Ukraine.
They refute the hypothesis that private ownership per se is associated with improved
performance. As a performance proxy they use profit, sales, and employment.4
The remaining part of article is organized as follows: In the second part we
investigate the evolution of ownership structure and in the third section we analyze
the relation between concentration and performance. A brief conclusion follows.
2. Development of Ownership Structures
The years 1991-1995 were marked by the ongoing process of voucher privatization.
The resulting ownership structure after both waves was more or less an outcome of
the logistics of the voucher scheme’s administration. In early 1995 the voucher
privatization scheme was officially concluded and subsequent changes in ownership
also reflected legal requirements to prevent excessive stakes being held by
privatization funds. More economically meaningful patterns of ownership structure
began to emerge in Czech companies in 1996. Since our goal is to examine the
changes in ownership structure of firms involved in the voucher privatization, we
focus our attention on these firms but supply some comparison with firms that did not
fall under the scheme as well.
2.1 Concentration of Ownership
The data sample was compiled from the commercial database Aspekt Ltd. and the
National Property Fund of the Czech Republic. It contains 645 firms for which
reported ownership data overlapped over the four year period. The voucher privatized
firms in the sample were involved in the first, second, or both waves of the voucher
privatization. The sample thus contains yearly ownership data for nearly 40% of the
1664 firms that were privatized within the voucher scheme.
2
                                                                
2 The first wave involved shares in 988 firms. The second one included shares in an additional 676
firms plus unsold shares in 185 firms carried over from the first wave.5
The voucher scheme did not fulfill its main mission to cut the ownership link
between the State and firms since a large amount of residual state property was left
after the voucher scheme ended along with significant potential control of the State
over a substantial part of the economy. Indeed, during the years 1996-1999 the share
stakes of the State in the (already) voucher privatized companies remained large and
only recently and slowly has the amount of residual state property begun to diminish
(see  Kocenda, 1999). A complicated web of interlocking and non-transparent
ownership structures emerged after the privatization was officially completed and thus
the Czech Republic does not offer a clear data environment to work with. The climate
may be illustrated by a situation in which a bank and an Investment Privatization
Fund (IPF) owned by such a bank are among a firm’s five largest owners. In such a
situation these two owners would surely act together - for example at the general
shareholders’ meeting - and thus should be understood as a coalition. Such a coalition
is naturally reinforced when the State has a major stake in a bank. There are also less
obvious cases of interlocking ownership which, however, cannot be dealt with due to
the limitations of the data as well as measurement obstacles (see Turnovec, 1999).
Figure 1 presents plots of densities of concentration indices C1 (single largest
owner), and C5 (five largest owners) for 645 firms involved in voucher privatization.
Each line represents a different year. All plots are the non-parametric densities, using
the Epanechnikov kernel (Epanechnikov, 1969). Ownership concentration measured
by C1 resembles a bi-modal distribution since it exhibits two prominent regions where
concentration occurs.
It is the left region, that spans between 0 and 35%, which shows quite a high
percentage of firms that fall here in 1996; their proportion gradually decreases
thereafter. In particular, the number of firms with C1 in the interval <0,35> decreased6
from 317 firms in 1996 to 151 firms in 1999. The second region centers around the
value 50%. The number of firms around this second hump has slightly increased
during the four years. In general, from Figure 1 we see that in 1996 the density of C1
looks more or less like a bi-modal distribution but, over the four year period, it has
become in its appearance closer to a normal distribution in 1999. Overall, the mean
value of C1 in our sample increased from 38.9% to 52%, as documented in Table 1.
Figure 1 also shows that the density function of the C5 index has gradually shifted
to the right, indicating a clear increase in ownership concentration of the five largest
shareholders. Table 2 complements the above figure, as it shows how the mean value
of the C5 index has increased from 57.4% in 1996 to 69.2% in 1999.
Both sets of findings are fully confirmed by the evolution of the Herfindahl index
(table not included) that serves as an alternative measure of ownership concentration
with respect to the C1 and C5 indices. The density of the index has become flatter and
its mean value has increased from 0.22 in 1996 to 0.35 in 1999.
In our sample of 645 firms involved in voucher privatization, there were 433 firms
privatized during the first wave, 91 during the second, and 121 firms privatized
gradually during both waves. In order to distinguish any possible characteristics that
might be specific to either the first or second wave of voucher privatization we
computed similar sets of statistics, as well as densities for three sub-samples of firms.
We found any specific characteristics to be insignificant and we do not report them.
Based on this result we do not distinguish in our further analysis whether a certain
firm was involved in the first, second, or both waves of voucher privatization. The
decisive parameter is whether a firm was involved in voucher privatization or not.
Following our previous results we investigate whether there are any similarities in
density functions of concentration indices and their evolution over time between7
voucher privatized firms and those that were not involved in the voucher scheme. We
computed exactly the same characteristics for 105 such firms (figures and tables are
not reported). The shape of the C1 density was found to be similar to the density of
the Student distribution. Moreover, the density function of the C5 became each year
flatter and flatter, and in 1999 index C5 was roughly uniformly distributed across the
interval (0,100). This is in sharp contrast with the skewed density of the C5 in the case
of privatized firms.
Despite the fact that the samples of firms involved in voucher privatization and
those not involved in it differ in size, we found that voucher privatized firms have a
persistently higher mean of ownership concentration. Further, voucher privatized
firms experienced more pronounced changes in ownership concentration and its
evolution was less regular. Even further, voucher privatized firms experienced their
largest change in ownership concentration within the part of the sample containing
firms where the single largest investor held a stake of  from 15 to 35%.
2.2 Changes in Type of Owner
The preceding shifting perspective of the changes in ownership structure necessitates
an analysis of changes in types of single largest owner of a firm. In our data set we
distinguish six types of owners: industrial company, bank, investment fund, individual
owner, portfolio company, and state.
3
The previous description of ownership concentration movements is amended by the
evolution of the mean ownership position of a particular type of single largest owner.
Table 3 shows the mean and standard deviation of the C1 index. The computed mean
                                                                
3 There is a difference between an investment fund and a portfolio company. An investment fund buys
shares of a certain company in order to exercise voting rights and to acquire profit from the company
later. On the other hand, a portfolio company buys shares of a certain firm in order to sell these shares8
is an arithmetic average of all shares of owners belonging to a particular group of
owners, and is calculated only for those firms in which this group appears as the
single largest owner.
We can see an increase in the mean value of the C1 for all types of owners from
1996 to 1999, except for the bank category. The highest C1 mean value in 1996
within all categories occurs among industrial company single owners (46.7%), and
remained so in 1999. Investment funds have the lowest value of the mean of the C1 in
1996. However, in 1999 their mean value reaches values comparable with other types
of owners. In general the highest average concentration increase between 1996 and
1999 was recorded in the case of investment funds (from 27.9 to 45.9, a 64%
increase) and portfolio companies (from 38.8 to 55.2, a 42% increase) as single
largest owners. A decrease in mean holding can be observed in the case of banks
(from 38.5 to 34.8, a 10% decrease).
Since the mean share holding has only limited explanatory value, Figures 2 and 3
present the entire densities of ownership concentration by category of single largest
owner over four consecutive years. We can see that over time the shapes of
distribution distinctively change. An increase in share position is clearly visible in the
humps moving from left to right. Recalling Figure 1 we can state that the two-hump
density of ownership concentration reflects the pattern in stake rankings of industrial
companies, investment funds, and individual owners. The disappearance of such a bi-
modal shape is the most prominent feature in the case of investment funds. Stakes of
the state exhibit the largest tendency to increase over time, while the number of such
firms decreases. This is fully in accord with the aim of the state to sell residual state
property but to maintain power in companies of special interest.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
for a higher price in order to realize a capital gain. A portfolio company does not attempt to exercise
voting rights or extract corporate profits.9
Table 4 summarizes information about changes in type of single largest owner
between the years 1996 and 1999. We identify the following trends:
a)  An industrial company is the most stable type of single largest owner, followed by
an individual owner. In 78% of firms whose single largest owner in 1996 was an
industrial company, the same was true in 1999. An individual owner was in the
same position in 58% of such firms.
b)  The most unstable type of owner is a portfolio company. In 1999 only 5% of firms
had such a single largest owner compared to 1996.
c)  An industrial company is the category of owner that recorded by far the largest
ownership gains. The evidence is presented by increases recorded in the first
column of the table.
3. Ownership and Performance
3.1 Methodology
In the current literature the relationship of performance and ownership is investigated
principally from the point of view of the effect of financial performance on the
ownership structure, rather than from ownership structure to financial variables. Here
we present an analysis of effect of ownership structure on economic performance.
We analyze the relationship between ownership structure and a firm’s performance
by employing three different panel-data models:





j j t i t i u Y I dC gPer ,
3
1 1
, , 1 e h g b a + + + + + = ￿ ￿
= =








t n n t i t i u Y I OS dC gPer ,
3
1 1 1
, , , 1 e h g x b a + + + + + + = ￿ ￿ ￿
= = =10








t n n t i t i u Y I O dC gPer ,
3
1 1 1
, , , 1 e h g x b a + + + + + + = ￿ ￿ ￿
= = =
In all three models gPeri,t is defined as the growth of a performance variable defined
earlier, namely gPeri,t =(Peri,t – Peri,t-1)/Peri,t-1. DC1i,t is the difference of ownership
concentration indices between two consecutive years, namely dC1i,t = C1i,t – C1i,t-1.
OSn,t is a share of ownership of each category of owners in total ownership of a
given firm and year, namely industrial company, bank, investment fund, individual
owner, and portfolio company (L = 5). State as a common numeraire is represented by
a constant term. The coefficients for other ownership categories thus represent
deviations from the effect of  State. On,t  is a dummy variable that indicates the type of
single largest owner in a particular year . These categories are the same as those for
OSn,t variables (L = 5). OSn,t variables are an alternative specification of On,t variables.
The difference between  On,t and OSn,t is that  On,t captures specifically the type of
single largest owner, whereas the OSn,t variable captures the cumulative shares of all
other owners in the firm of the same type. Such an approach allows us to investigate a
broader picture of the relationship of ownership concentration and its structure to a
firm’s performance than is usual in the current literature.
Sector dummies, Ij, are used to capture sector-specific shocks. The Prague Stock
Exchange classification contains 19 different types of industry sectors. We do not
incorporate two of them, finance and banking, and investment funds, due to data
insufficiency. Finally,  Ym are year dummies to correct for changes in institutional
environment as well as economy-wide shocks in a given year;  ui represents the
random effect.
3.2. Measures of Performance and Data11
For further analysis we define a broad set of financial indicators in order to capture
different aspects of a firm’s performance: profitability, strength and size of the firm,
its financial position, and its scope of business activity. The set of variables we use is
divided based on the following criteria:
1.  Profitability of a company: as measures of profitability we employ gross operating
profit over sales revenue, per-cent growth in operating profit, and value-added
over staff costs (wages).
2.  Strength and size of a firm: we use change in total assets, change in fixed assets,
and cash-flow over equity.
3.  Financial position: as a measure we use a change in long-term and short-term
bank loans.
4.  Scope of business activity: we measure this performance by employing change in
sales of own production.
Essential characteristics of the above financial variables in 1996 are shown in Table
5. The sample clearly represents a very diverse group of firms with both poor and
good economic performance.
Overall we analyze nine different performance variables in contrast to two or three
usually examined in the literature. The data sample originates from the same sources
as in the previous section. We use the previously described ownership data together
with financial data of Czech firms listed on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) for
years 1996-1999. All financial variables were defined using international accounting
standards. Due to serious limits of data availability we do not require that
performance data of each particular firm be available for all four consecutive years.
Instead we relax data availability to a minimum of three consecutive years in order to
enlarge our sample size. Consequently, the sample consists of 722 firms that posted12
data for three (65% of firms) or four (35% of firms) consecutive years within the
interval 1996-1999 and covers more than 43% of voucher privatized firms.
4
Despite the fact that the data sample covers a considerable portion of voucher
privatized companies the data to pose limits to work within. Having firms' ownership
and performance data does not mean that we know what information is available to an
investor when his/her acquisition decision is made. Changes in ownership structure
may be a function of an investor's prior knowledge of potential future performance of
a firm rather than being exogenously determined.
The above requires that within the econometric part of our analysis we have to deal
with problems of endogeneity of ownership structure. Two basic strategies can be
used. The instrumental variable technique requires finding valid instruments. These
instruments could be, for example, lagged values of the left-hand side variables. In
our case it would be lagged concentration index. Then, regressing performance
variable on concentration index using lagged values of index as an instrument would
produce almost the same specification - changes in concentration index - as a left-
hand side variable. The fact that the time dimension of our panel is disqualifies using
the instrumental variable technique.
Instead of the above technique we use the first logarithmic differences of ownership
concentration index to eliminate the endogeneity problem. In regression we also use
growth rates of financial variables rather than their nominal values. Since the growth
rates of financial variables are not correlated over time, such an approach also solves
the problem of their rather high autocorrelation levels. The interpretation of
coefficients in the case of growth variables is easy and straightforward.
                                                                
4 For two performance indicators (Cash Flow/Equity and Short-term Bank Loans) the scarcity of data
reduced sample sizes.13
Due to the nature of the data in hand we are unable to entirely disentangle two
issues: whether ownership affects performance or whether we can just better predict
performance. Theory suggests approaching analysis of firms' performance with a
direct control measure. The best proxy available is an ownership ratio but it is still an
imperfect control measure. The following empirical results should be understood as
the output of a serious attempt to research an important topic within transition
literature, albeit conducted with the limited resources at hand.
3.3 Empirical Results
Results of all estimations are presented in Tables 6-14. In all regressions the F-test
rejects the hypothesis that a common constant term across firms is appropriate.
Moreover, the Hausman-specification test (Hausman, 1978) in all cases indicates that
the random effect model is more appropriate than the specific effect model. Regarding
sets of dummies, we chose state ownership and year 1996 as a common numeraire.
Based on the insignificance of the respective dummy variables no industry sector was
found to have a specific effect with respect to a firm's performance.
First, we estimated Model I. Based on our results we conclude that ownership
concentration does not explain a change in a firm’s performance. Since the
coefficients of the variable for a change in index of single largest ownership
concentration have different signs and magnitudes (albeit very small), it is tempting to
discuss their effect on performance. However, we are left instead with their statistical
insignificance.
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that one should use the logistic transformation of
the C1 or C5 index instead of its usual values. It is done to convert the bounded
independent variable C1 into an unbounded one, defined as a logistic transformation14
ln[C1/(100-C1)]. We checked whether our results were sensitive to this
transformation of ownership concentration and performed an analysis with a newly
defined concentration variable as well. We report that all coefficients of the
transformed ownership concentration variable were insignificant, the same as with our
findings. Therefore, we consider our results to be robust with respect to alternative
definition of the ownership concentration.
Claessens and Djankov (1999) performed a similar type of regression on data from
Czech firms. They used only two measures of performance: profitability and labor
productivity. Their definition of profitability is very similar to ours; therefore their
results can be cautiously compared with ours. However, the difference is that they
used data for years 1993-1996. In their regression, where they take into account
endogeneity factors and autocorrelation of performance variables, they  found
ownership concentration (and its square) insignificant for a firm’s profitability.
Despite that we use a different time span, as well as a different data set, we conclude
that our results are in line with theirs. Regarding labor productivity they find
ownership concentration significant. Since we do not have data on employment, we
could not construct any  variable which would capture changes in employees’
productivity and make any comparison with their findings on that basis.
We additionally analyze whether certain types of owners have a specific effect on
firms’ performance. Models II and III were estimated for this purpose. We regress the
performance variables on ownership concentration and type of owner along with
yearly and industry dummies. In the literature (Claessens and Djankov, 1999) it is
usual to construct the share of ownership of each category in total ownership of a
given firm. Since we are using the C1 index-share of single largest owner, we
construct a set of dummy variables indicating the type of owner of this largest share.15
For comparision we report results for a cumulative share of a certain type in the firm
as well.
Based on estimation of type II and III models we found the coefficient of change in
ownership concentration to be insignificant in all regressions. This fact is in line with
our results from Model I, and thus we conclude that we did not find any evidence for
ownership concentration having an influence on firms’ performance.
As for the effect of a particular type of owner the results do not provide evidence
that in general the type of owner has an effect on a firm’s performance. The
overwhelming majority of respective coefficients were found to be statistically
insignificant. We did not find any evidence in either Model II or III that the type of
owner or its cumulative share would have an effect on firms' performance measured
by defined indicators. This is the case for GOP/Sales, operating profit growth, value
added/staff costs, growth of short-term bank loans, and growth of sales. Tables 6-8
and 13-14 present the evidence.
However, there exists clear and convincing evidence about the effect of a certain
type of owner or its cumulative share on specific performance measures. Investment
funds, either as single holders or cumulatively, tend to negatively affect growth of
both total and fixed assets. Individual owners as single largest holders tend to
negatively affect growth of total assets, while individual owners and industrial
companies as cumulative shareholders show a negative impact on growth of fixed
assets (Tables 10-11). The presence of the state (represented by a constant term)
positively affects the cash flow/equity ratio, while portfolio company as a cumulative
shareholder has a negative impact (Table 9). Industrial  companies, either as single
holders or cumulatively, tend to decrease the growth of long-term bank loans. The16
same is true for investment funds as single largest owners and banks as cumulative
owners (Table 12).
4. Conclusions
The years 1991-1995 were marked by an ongoing process of voucher privatization.
The resulting ownership structure after both its waves was more or less an outcome of
the logistics of the voucher scheme’s administration. In 1995 changes in ownership
also reflected legal requirements to prevent excessive stakes being held by
privatization funds. More economically meaningful patterns of ownership structure
began to emerge in Czech companies in 1996.
The changes in ownership structure from 1996 to 1999 in voucher privatized firms
was analyzed with respect to different concentration levels. The single largest owner
was found to be a decisive shareholder.
The changes in ownership structure were then analyzed based on six types of
owners: industrial company, bank, investment fund, individual owner, portfolio
company, and state. In general the highest average concentration increase between
1996 and 1999 was recorded in the case of investment funds (from 27.9 to 45.9, a
64% increase) and portfolio companies (from 38.8 to 55.2, a 42% increase) as single
largest owners. A decrease in mean holding can be observed in the case of banks
(from 38.5 to 34.8, a 10% decrease).
Detailed information about changes in type of single largest owner between the
years 1996 and 1999 can be condensed in the following observations. Industrial
companies are the most stable type of single largest owner, followed by individual
owners. The most unstable type of owner is a portfolio company. In 1999 only 5% of17
firms had such a single largest owner as in 1996. An industrial company is the
category of owner that recorded by far the largest ownership gains over time.
Further we performed an econometric analysis of the effect of ownership structure
on firms’ economic performance. We defined a broad set of financial variables in
order to capture different aspects of a firm’s performance. A set of variables was
selected to capture profitability of a company, strength and size of a firm, its financial
position, and its scope of business activity. Moreover, in order to seize the effect of
owner type on a firm’s performance, we incorporated in our models two types of
dummy variables for five different categories of owners, and a share of ownership per
each category in total ownership of a given firm. Based on pre-testing procedures we
adopted a random effect model.
Based on our results we conclude that ownership concentration does not explain a
change in a firm’s performance. Further, no industry sector was found to have a
specific effect with respect to a firm's performance. Using a random effect model we
did not find any overwhelming evidence that type of owner has an effect on a firm’s
performance. However, there exists clear and convincing evidence about the effect of
a certain type of owner or its cumulative share on specific performance measures.18
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Table 1
Ownership Concentration Measured by C1 Index: Voucher Privatized Firms
Concentration
Index (Year)
Num.of Obs. Mean Stand. Deviation
C1 (1996) 645 38.91 19.28
C1 (1997) 645 42.80 20.38
C1 (1998) 645 48.62 21.51
C1 (1999) 645 51.82 21.79
Table 2
Ownership Concentration Measured by C5 Index: Voucher Privatized Firms
Concentration
Index (Year)
Num.of Obs. Mean Stand. Deviation
C5 (1996) 645 57.40 19.90
C5 (1997) 645 61.29 19.95
C5 (1998) 645 67.04 19.44
C5 (1999) 645 69.17 19.10
Table 3
Ownership position of the particular types of single largest owner
Descriptive statistics for C1 index of owner type
Year
Num. of
obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1996 294 46.65 19.16 5.82 99.02 Industrial
company 1999 399 55.75 20.91 5.49 99.30
1996 19 38.54 20.45 9.15 75.98 Bank
1999 8 34.77 13.04 17.61 49.90
1996 145 27.92 15.43 3.00 88.34 Investment
fund 1999 94 45.92 20.71 5.64 90.53
1996 89 35.12 15.18 2.86 69.09 Individual 1999 109 44.64 22.68 0.36 92.22
1996 38 38.79 17.79 11.62 85.64 Portfolio
company 1999 18 55.17 23.83 17.17 91.02































1999 17 42.99 20.43 5.00 72.6321
Table 4
Changes in Ownership Concentration by Type of Single Largest Owner: 1996-1999








Industrial co. 78% 0% 7% 10% 3% 2% 100%
Bank 53% 11% 21% 10% 5% 0% 100%
Invest. Fund 57% 2% 31% 8% 2% 0% 100%
Individual 34% 0% 6% 58% 2% 0% 100%




































State 48% 3% 12% 12% 3% 22% 100%
Table 5
Basic characteristics of growth rates of financial variables: 1996-1999
No. of
Firms Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Gross operating profit / Sales 722 -0.059 1.547 -7.153 4.847
Operating Profit 722 0.054 1.435 -5.513 4.560
Value Added / Staff Costs 722 0.047 0.503 -2.847 5.095
Total Assets 722 -0.006 0.161 -0.658 0.847
Fixed Assets 722 0.001 0.198 -0.749 1.434
Cash Flow / Equity 436 0.047 0.263 -0.297 0.733
Long-term Bank Loans 722 -0.245 0.521 -1.000 1.965
Short-term Bank Loans 577 -0.108 0.546 -1.278 1.758
Sales of Own Production 722 0.040 0.351 -0.951 3.407Model I Model II Model III





Constant -0.420 -0.393 -0.463
(0.216) (0.325) (0.291)
Industrial Company - -0.038 -
- (0.242) -
Bank - -0.270 -
- (0.631) -
Investment Fund - -0.126 -
- (0.261) -
Individual Owner - 0.145 -
- (0.268) -
Portfolio Company - -0.057 -
- (0.386) -
Industrial Company - - 0.043
- - (0.195)
Bank - - -0.250
- - (0.461)
Investment Fund - - -0.131
- - (0.211)
Individual Owner - - 0.181
- - (0.220)
Portfolio Company - - 0.127
- - (0.289)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Yearly dummies Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.027 0.029 0.027
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses.
          Yes means that specific dummies are included in regressio
Model I Model II Model III





Constant -0.278 -0.282 -0.342
(0.201) (0.302) (0.270)
Industrial Company - -0.007 -
- (0.225) -
Bank - -0.326 -
- (0.587) -
Investment Fund - -0.029 -
- (0.242) -
Individual Owner - 0.114 -
- (0.249) -
Portfolio Company - 0.103 -
- (0.359) -
Industrial Company - - 0.060
- - (0.181)
Bank - - -0.260
- - (0.429)
Investment Fund - - -0.049
- - (0.196)
Individual Owner - - 0.172
- - (0.205)
Portfolio Company - - 0.270
- - (0.268)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes






Note : Standard errors are in parentheses.
          Yes means that specific dummies are included in regressio
TABLE 7




















































































































pModel I Model II Model III





Constant 0.053 0.038 -0.003
(0.076) (0.114) (0.101)
Industrial Company - 0.013 -
- (0.084) -
Bank - -0.057 -
- (0.211) -
Investment Fund - 0.002 -
- (0.091) -
Individual Owner - 0.025 -
- (0.093) -
Portfolio Company - 0.093 -
- (0.132) -
Industrial Company - - 0.057
-- (0.067)
Bank - - 0.005
-- (0.153)
Investment Fund - - 0.062
-- (0.073)
Individual Owner - - 0.047
-- (0.076)
Portfolio Company - - 0.131
-- (0.098)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Yearly dummies Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.024 0.025 0.024
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses.
          Yes means that specific dummies are included in regressio
Model I Model II Model III
 Change in C1 -8.91E-05 1.07E-04 3.87E-05
(7.4E-04) (7.5E-04) (7.5E-04)
Constant 0.035 0.114 0.088 C
(0.058) (0.081) (0.074)
Industrial Company - -0.083 -
- (0.056) -
Bank - -0.004 -
- (0.160) -
Investment Fund - -0.078 -
- (0.061) -
Individual Owner - -0.042 -
- (0.064) -
Portfolio Company - -0.130 -
- (0.086) -
Industrial Company - - -0.053
-- (0.045)
Bank - - -0.111
-- (0.118)
Investment Fund - - -0.063
-- (0.050)
Individual Owner - - -0.033
-- (0.053)
Portfolio Company ---0.107 C
-- (0.064)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Yearly dummies Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.025 0.031 0.025
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses.
          C denotes significance at 10% level.




















































































































Value Added / Staff Costs
TABLE 8
Cash Flow/EquityModel I Model II Model III





Constant -0.026 0.020 0.001
(0.024) (0.035) (0.032)
Industrial Company - -0.034 -
- (0.026) -
Bank - -0.075 -
- (0.064) -
Investment Fund - -0.075 A -
- (0.028) -
Individual Owner - -0.053 C -
- (0.029) -
Portfolio Company - -0.066 -
- (0.040) -
Industrial Company - - -0.022
-- (0.021)
Bank - - -0.045
-- (0.047)
Investment Fund - - -0.050 B
-- (0.023)
Individual Owner - - -0.026
-- (0.024)
Portfolio Company - - -0.029
-- (0.030)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Yearly dummies Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.062 0.072 0.062
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses.
          A, B and C  denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.
          Yes means that specific dummies are included in regression.
Model I Model II Model III





Constant -0.024 0.034 0.033
(0.030) (0.044) (0.040)
Industrial Company - -0.052 -
- (0.033) -
Bank - -0.041 -
- (0.081) -
Investment Fund - -0.094 A -
- (0.035) -
Individual Owner - -0.059 -
- (0.037) -
Portfolio Company - -0.017 -
- (0.051) -




Investment Fund ---0.091 A
-- (0.028)




Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Yearly dummies Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.028 0.034 0.028
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses.
          A, B and C  denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.






















































































































yModel I Model II Model III





Constant -0.455 -0.309 -0.359
(0.079) (0.118) (0.105)
Industrial Company - -0.169 C -
- (0.087) -
Bank - -0.165 -
- (0.212) -
Investment Fund - -0.155 C -
- (0.093) -
Individual Owner - -0.067 -
- (0.096) -
Portfolio Company - -0.081 -
- (0.134) -
Industrial Company - - -0.116 C
-- (0.069)
Bank - - -0.255 C
-- (0.154)
Investment Fund - - -0.072
-- (0.075)
Individual Owner - - -0.012
-- (0.078)
Portfolio Company - - -0.103
-- (0.099)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Yearly dummies Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.032 0.037 0.032
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses.
          C denotes significance at 10% level.
          Yes means that specific dummies are included in regression.
Model I Model II Model III





Constant -0.205 -0.187 -0.222
(0.065) (0.105) (0.093)
Industrial Company - 0.006 -
- (0.084) -
Bank - -0.040 -
- (0.159) -
Investment Fund - -0.053 -
- (0.091) -
Individual Owner - -0.048 -
- (0.094) -
Portfolio Company - -0.139 -
- (0.127) -










Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Yearly dummies Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.041 0.042 0.041
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses.






















































































































yModel I Model II Model III





Constant -0.278 -0.282 -0.342
(0.201) (0.302) (0.270)
Industrial Company - -0.007 -
- (0.225) -
Bank - -0.326 -
- (0.587) -
Investment Fund - -0.029 -
- (0.242) -
Individual Owner - 0.114 -
- (0.249) -
Portfolio Company - 0.103 -
- (0.359) -
Industrial Company - - 0.060
-- (0.181)
Bank - - -0.260
-- (0.429)
Investment Fund - - -0.049
-- (0.196)
Individual Owner - - 0.172
-- (0.205)
Portfolio Company - - 0.270
-- (0.268)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Yearly dummies Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.024 0.025 0.024
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses.
          Yes means that specific dummies are included in regression.
TABLE 14

























































y              C1 represents the average percentage of the equity owned by the single largest investor and
              C5 that held by the five largest investors. 
Figure 1
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